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Canadian Immigration Law 
in the Face of a Volatile Politics
By Colin Grey,* Constance MacIntosh** and Sarah Marsden***
The genesis of this special issue was a conference of Canadian 
immigration law scholars at the Université du Québec à Montréal in March 
2018. Conference participants sought to look back on the many changes 
made to Canadian immigration law during the near-decade the Stephen 
Harper-led Conservative government spent in power (2006–2015). Although 
the Conservatives did not introduce a single, revamped immigration law—
the major legislation remains the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act,? brought in under the Jean Chrétien-led Liberals (1992–2006) in 
2002—they altered parts of the law nearly beyond recognition.? In this 
introduction, we re? ect brie? y on these changes; on what has come after, 
under Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government (2015–), which has employed 
a more welcoming rhetoric yet left most of its predecessor’s amendments 
in place; and on what may lie ahead as we approach a federal election in 
which immigration again promises to be an important issue.
Why, at a conference of legal scholars, the results of which are now 
published in a law journal, did we consider it apt to frame our discussion 
around the political parties that happen to hold power? Our answer is 
that it is nearly impossible to examine immigration law meaningfully 
without focusing on how the politics of immigration have changed and are 
changing, in Canada and globally. As those who teach and practice it are 
aware, immigration law evolves continuously; there is no such thing as 
an up-to-date syllabus. But the politics shift rapidly, too. And the political 
transformations shape the legal ones, and vice-versa. Thus, our opening 
premise is that to understand the law, you have to understand the politics. As 
will be evident throughout this special issue, a focus on both immigration law 
and politics allows us to do more than critique the decisions of a particular 
government: it makes visible the ways in which deeper dynamics between 
immigration law and politics persist even as governments change. 
1. SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
2. As Ratna Omidvar has written elsewhere: “The immigration system has undergone a small revo-
lution. The name, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, is merely the skin of an old system. 
Inside is a very different beast”: Ratna Omidvar, “The Harper In? uence on Immigration” in Jennifer 
Ditchburn & Graham Fox, eds, The Harper Factor: Assessing a Prime Minister’s Policy Legacy (Mon-
treal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016) at 179.
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It is not fruitful either to focus on the rhetoric of closure and fear of 
the Harper-led Conservatives or the rhetoric of openness and optimism 
of the Trudeau-led Liberals. Indeed, neither tells the whole story of 
either government. It is plausible to claim, as Donald Galloway writes 
in this issue, that Conservative immigration policies bore the imprint 
of “xenophobic ideologies which may, in turn, have been fertilized 
autopoetically by government laws and policies.”3 But it is also plausible to 
claim that “for the most part, it is remarkable and laudable that the outlook 
of Harper’s Conservative Party remained liberal and pro-immigrant in a 
growing global anti-immigrant environment.”4 After all, the Conservatives 
increased immigration numbers, continued to endorse multiculturalism, and 
assiduously courted suburban voters belonging to immigrant and minority 
communities as part of an “ethnic strategy” to target new Canadians whom 
they believed shared conservative values.5 Similarly, it is obvious that the 
new Liberal government is “more temperate in its language.”6 Yet it is 
also possible to criticize this government for leaving in place or merely 
tweaking many of the changes installed by its predecessor—including some 
of the most controversial—and for perpetuating the underlying structural 
dynamics that all too often render non-citizens vulnerable to oppression 
and unfreedom. 
It is true that the Conservative government distinguished itself by 
going much further down certain policy roads.7 The Conservative era 
brought a marked rise in temporary migration, both relative to permanent 
migration and in absolute terms.8 Immigration policy underwent signi? cant 
decentralization, devolving selection power to the provinces, territories or 
3. Donald Galloway, “Immigration, Xenophobia, and Equality Rights” (2019) 42:1 Dal LJ 17 at 22.
4. Omidvar, ????? note 2 at 182. We refrain from evaluating the relative plausibility of these claims. 
Other attempts at evaluating the legacy of the Harper Conservatives in immigration include: Peter J 
Carver, “A Failed Discourse of Distrust Amid Signi? cant Procedural Change: The Harper Government’s 
Legacy in Immigration and Refugee Law” (2016) 21:2 Rev Const Stud 209; Erin Tolley, “Political 
Players or Partisan Pawns? Immigrants, Minorities, and Conservatives in Canada” in JP Lewis & 
Joanna Everitt, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2017) 102 at 112-16. As Paquet and Larios write, “Immigration policy 
changes implemented under this government have been hard to characterize because they moved in 
several directions—both restrictive and liberalizing—and used different discourses as justi? cations, 
from the idea of the economic contribution of immigrants to the trope of the “bogus” refugee claimant.” 
(see Mireille Paquet & Lindsay Larios, “Venue Shopping and Legitimacy: Making Sense of Harper’s 
Immigration Record” (2018) 51:4 Can J Political Science 817).
5. Tolley, ????? note 4 at 112-116. See also Omidvar, ????? note 2. 
6. Galloway, ????? note 3 at footnote 17.
7. Good overviews of the Conservatives’ immigration reforms include: Naomi Alboim & Karen Kohl, 
“Shaping the Future: Canada’s Rapidly Changing Immigration Policies” (October 2012), online (pdf): 
????????????????????maytree.com/wp-content/uploads/shaping-the-future.pdf> [perma.cc/H6N9-
R67Y]; Lotf Ali Jan Ali, “Welcome to Canada? A Critical Review and Assessment of Canada’s Fast-
Changing Immigration Policies,” (2014) RCIS Working Paper No 2014/6, online (pdf): ???????? ??????
???????????????????????????????<www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/rcis/documents/RCIS_WP_Ali_Final.
pdf> [perma.cc/66E8-66HL]. 
8. As Sarah Marsden notes in this issue. See also Alboim & Cohl, ????? note 7, at 45-53; Ali, ????? 
note 7, at 9-14.
??
to private actors.9 The Conservatives radically transformed both the system 
for hearing refugee protection claims in Canada,10 as well as the system 
for selecting economic immigrants, culminating in a new “Express Entry” 
system that includes a step in which applicants are selected by computer 
algorithm based on a regularly updated new “Comprehensive Ranking 
System.”11 They expanded the grounds for losing citizenship and raised the 
bar for acquiring it.12 Finally, as several authors in this special issue note, 
in selling this agenda the Conservatives often employed a vocabulary of 
suspicion toward refugee claimants as well as toward citizens to whom 
they seemed to impute dual loyalties. This manifested itself during the 
2015 federal election, during which the Conservatives pledged to ban 
face coverings during citizenship ceremonies, a measure seen as targeting 
Muslim women, and to create a tip line for people to report “barbaric 
cultural practices.”13 It also seems to be the case that the Liberals won in 
2015 in part by capitalizing on the perception that the Conservatives had 
become excessively restrictive and, in particular, anti-Islamic in a way that 
enough Canadians saw as contrary to their values, as well as inhumane in 
the face of the surge in the numbers of refugees worldwide, particularly 
those from Syria.14 
At the same time, however, many of the trends in law and policy that 
scholars and activists found noteworthy or troubling in the Conservative 
approach to immigration had begun under the Chrétien Liberals and have 
9. Alboim & Cohl, supra note 7 at 14-19; Ali, supra note 7 at 9; Sasha Baglay, “Provincial Nominee 
Programs: A Note on Policy Implications and Future Research Directions” (2012) 13:1 J Intl Migration 
& Integration 121.
10. Most notably in the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c 8 [BRRA] and the Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17 [PCISA]. This aspect of the Conservatives’ im-
migration policy reforms has garnered the most attention. In addition to the papers by Hilary Evans 
Cameron and Hélène Mayrand in this issue, see Emily Bates & Jennifer Bond, “Troubling Signs: 
Mapping Access to Justice in Canada’s Refugee System Reform” (2015) 47:1 Ottawa L Rev 1; Angus 
Grant & Sean Rehaag, “Unappealing: An Assessment of the Limits on Appeal Rights in Canada’s New 
Refugee Determination System” (2016) 49:1 UBC L Rev 203; Idil Atak, Graham Hudson & Delphine 
Nakache, “’Making Canada’s Refugee System Faster and Fairer’: Reviewing the Stated Goals and Un-
intended Consequences of the 2012 Reform” (2017) CARFMS/ACERMF Working Paper No. 2017/3, 
online: Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies  <carfms.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/CARFMS-WPS-No11-Idil-Atak.pdf> [perma.cc/27T3-UMSJ].  
11. In addition to the paper by Asha Kaushal in this issue, see Alboim & Cohl, supra note 7 at 21-27; 
Ali, supra note 7 at 3-14, 18-19; Carver, supra note 4 at 228-230.
12. For discussion of some of the reforms of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29, see Elke Winter, 
“(Im)possible citizens: Canada’s ‘citizenship bonanza’ and its boundaries.” (2014) 18:1 Citizenship 
Studies 46; for other discussions of the changes to the Citizenship Act, see Craig Forcese, “A Tale of 
Two Citizenships: Citizenship Revocation for ‘Traitors and Terrorists’” (2014) 39:2 Queen’s LJ 551.
13. Tolley, supra note 4 at 112. 
14. Ibid at 122-123; Omidvar, supra note 2 at 184. 
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carried on under the Trudeau Liberals:15 a focus on security, perhaps to the 
detriment of rights; an expanding overlap between criminal and immigration 
law; a growing number of legal tools and strategies developed to either 
discourage or prevent refugees from claiming protection, or to withdraw 
protection once granted; and an ongoing quest for greater ? exibility for 
executive actors in the administration and promulgation of the rules of 
immigration law and policy. In other words, the continuities outweigh the 
discontinuities between the different governments. It was, after all, the 
Chrétien Liberals who signed the Safe Third Country Agreement, under 
which either Canadian or U.S. of? cials can return refugee claimants to the 
other country if they arrived there ? rst. It is the Trudeau Liberals who are 
now renegotiating it in the face of large numbers of asylum seekers crossing 
into Canada from the United States.16 Or, as Hélène Mayrand17 notes in this 
issue, while the Liberals have been afforded the chance (through the private 
members’ bill of an NDP MP), they have not acted to repeal a provision of 
the IRPA introduced by the Conservatives that leads to inadmissibility and 
the loss of permanent resident status for refugees who return to their home 
countries—even when such trips were undertaken before the new measure 
was put in place.18 For her part, Constance Macintosh critiques a new Liberal 
policy aimed at barring fewer non-citizens from permanent residence on 
account of the health care costs they are likely to incur. She argues that by 
limiting, rather than eliminating, the health care bar “it is not that Canada 
has stopped discriminating, it is that Canada is now discriminating against 
a smaller number of people with disabilities or health conditions.”19
Finally, the managerial ethos that birthed the new Express Entry system for 
economic-class immigrants at the end of the Conservative’s last mandate is 
a direct descendant of the points system that originated under the Liberals 
in 1967. The new Liberal government, as Asha Kaushal writes in this issue, 
has continued to “re? ne” the system but otherwise left it in place.20
15. In 1998, Yasmeen Abu-Luban traced the beginning of a new Canadian immigration policy era 
to the early 1990s, when she said the politics of immigration in Canada moved away from a period in 
which there had been “a secure consensus over the general value of immigration” to one characterized 
by a greater emphasis on addressing security risks, admitting more “self-suf? cient” immigrants, and 
reducing family immigration. This new era was largely ushered in under the Chrétien liberals: Yasmeen 
Abu-Laban, “welcome/STAY OUT: The Contradiction of Canadian Integration and Immigration Poli-
cies at the Millenium” (1998) 30:3 Can Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Can 190; see also Yasmeen 
Abu-Laban, “Jean Chrétien’s Immigration Legacy” (2004) 9 R études const/Rev Const Stud 133.
16. Michele Zilio & Adrian Morrow, “Canada, U.S. move to redraft border treaty to cut ? ow of 
asylum seekers,” The Globe and Mail (1 April 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-us-moves-to-open-talks-with-canada-on-asylum-seeker-treaty/> [perma.cc/C43E-YNL2].
17. Hélène Mayrand, “Quand voyager mène au renvoi : analyse critique de la législation canadienne 
sur la perte du statut de résident permanent liée à la perte de l’asile” (2019) 42:1 Dal LJ 183.
18. IRPA, s 46(1)(c.1). Under this provision, a permanent resident loses their status if their need for 
refugee protection is found to have ceased under IRPA, ss 108(1)(a) to (d) and 108(2) for such reasons 
as, for example, having “voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country of nationality.” 
19. Constance Macintosh, “Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and Mentally Disabled Would-be 
Immigrants: Canada’s Story Continues” (2019) 42:1 Dal LJ 125 at 147.
20. Asha Kaushal, “Do the Means Change the Ends? Express Entry and Economic Immigration in 
Canada” (2019) 42:1 Dal LJ 83.
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So there are differences of rhetoric, but much that is shared: a kind 
of iterative collaborative effort across alternating governments to expand 
the tools for immigration control. As a result, in studying the law through 
the lens of politics, we should not necessarily focus on the positions 
publicly embraced, or even necessarily on the particular policies pursued, 
by this or that government or this or that party. Rather, the most salient 
characteristics of immigration politics today seem (to us) to be its volatility 
and polarization. This volatility and polarization result, according to a new 
study by the political scientists David Brady, John Ferejohn, and Aldo 
Aparo, from increasing anxieties with respect to immigration, brought about 
by globalization and made more pronounced since the onset of the Great 
Recession in 2008.21 The anxieties have caused a signi? cant disconnect 
between mainstream political parties and their supporters: that is, voters 
across the West—including in Canada, for all three major parties—perceive 
their favoured party as more pro-immigration than they are.22 This makes 
immigration politics dangerous terrain. Some parties respond by trying to 
? ght off populist capture by speaking to those anxieties (as we write, this 
seems to be the case with the current federal Conservative opposition, or 
the Coalition Avenir Québec government in Québec). Others seek to tame 
or face down these anxieties with a mix of lofty language accompanied by 
reassurances of control (as seems to be the case with the federal Liberals). 
In some ways, the latter stance is more worrying, since the balance between 
openness and control is harder to strike.
Many different kinds of analyses might be undertaken with this political 
instability as starting point, as the papers in this issue show. In the remainder 
of this introduction, we offer just one that might serve as a connecting thread. 
One role of the law (or of the rule of law) is to provide a set of public 
law rules and principles—administrative, constitutional, and international 
—that moderate or discipline the exercise of political power. Such rules 
and principles in theory ensure that political power, forced to adhere to 
formal constraints or to respect certain rights, avoids the worst abuses 
and even evinces a baseline of respect toward subjects of the law. If that 
is a fair statement, the question becomes how far immigration law can be 
expected to moderate or discipline the exercise of political power over 
non-citizens, when the exercise of that power promises to be unstable and 
thus in increasing danger of arbitrariness.
There is cause for worry. One reason to worry is that, at root, immigration 
21. David Brady, John Ferejohn & Aldo Paparo, “Political Economy and Immigration” (2018)  NYU 
School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 19-03, online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3295178> [perma.cc/7E9Z-MWUN]. The paper shows that in Canada, as in six other 
countries studied, mainstream political parties are generally perceived as being more pro-immigrant 
than other parties. Another important work that seeks to trace the connection between immigration and 
populist politics is Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, “Immigration” chapter 6 of Cultural Backlash: 
Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
22. Ibid. Brady, Ferejohn & Paparo discuss data relating to the federal Conservatives, Liberals, and 
New Democratic Party in Canada. They do not present data on the Green Party.
v
law rests on a doctrine that grants extraordinarily broad executive and 
legislative discretion to control the movement across borders, and the 
territorial presence, of non-citizens. The statement of this doctrine invoked 
most often by present-day Canadian courts comes from Justice Sopinka’s 
majority opinion in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 
v Chiarelli: “The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that 
non-citizens do not have an unquali? ed right to enter or remain in the 
country.”23 This fundamental principle can ultimately be traced back (another 
continuity) to an earlier era of (largely racial) anti-immigration animus. In the 
face of laws passed by White settler countries aimed at excluding different 
Asian groups on account of their race at the end of the nineteenth and the 
open of the twentieth centuries, the courts to a large extent abdicated their 
role, ceding an “absolute and unquali? ed” power over immigration to the 
political branches.24 If Justice Sopinka was merely smuggling this principle 
of absolute discretion into the Charter era, it means that immigration law 
need only be based on national self-interest, with no regard for the needs or 
rights of non-citizens. Such an immigration law would do little to temper an 
unstable new politics. This may explain why, as Sarah Marsden argues in 
this issue, the rule of law seems to lose its moderating or disciplining force 
when the state polices membership within Canada’s borders, especially in 
the case of migrant workers. Using the example of the longstanding use 
of seasonal migrant labour in agriculture, Marsden contrasts the de jure 
existence of multiple legal remedies for workers as well as increasing policy 
talk of rights and protection with the de facto subordination of workers, 
which is also a product of the doctrine of ultimate sovereign power. She 
argues that it is only through direct worker action within and beyond the 
law that the rights of migrant workers can be vindicated.
But Justice Sopinka’s invocation of the “fundamental principle” 
contains an important ambiguity. On the one hand, it is in fact redolent 
of past assertions of absolutist discretion grounded in a now-submerged 
racial logic. This is the face of immigration law that yields to a politics 
of fear and control. It is the part of immigration law that allows minors to 
23. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 SCR 711, 90 DLR (4th) 
289 para 26 [Chiarelli]. Justice Sopinka cites two cases in support: R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, 
[1973] 2 All ER 741, 2 WLR 949; Prata v Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 1 SCR 376, 
52 DLR (3d) 383 [Prata]. He might have cited the older Privy Council case in which Lord Atkinson 
wrote, “One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit 
an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel 
or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his presence in the 
State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its social or material interests.” Canada 
(Attorney General) v Cain, [1906] AC 542, [1906] UKPC 55 (PC), at 546.
24. Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698 (1893). Here we draw on the discussion in Colin Grey, 
“Inegalitarianism in Immigration Governance” chapter 2 of Justice and Authority in Immigration Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
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be detained,25 appeal rights to be denied,26 long-pending applications for 
permanent residence to be cancelled.27 This is the part of immigration law 
that gives way to what Peter Carver has called a “discourse of distrust”28 or 
what Catherine Dauvergne has called “mean-spirited.”29 Not surprisingly, 
several of the contributions to this issue discuss the Harper Conservatives’ 
mobilization of this kind of immigration politics. Lobat Sadrehashemi offers 
a vivid illustration by way of a case study of the government’s response to 
boat arrivals. Sadrehashemi notes that within hours of the arrival of some 
492 Tamil asylum seekers off the coast of British Columbia, former Minister 
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Vic Toews denounced the 
passengers as terrorists and people smugglers. This statement was prelude 
to an aggressive campaign to contest all their refugee protection claims, to 
get as many as possible declared inadmissible, and to use all available tools 
to keep them in detention. The campaign against these boat arrivals also 
foreshadowed the kind of language used to sell the Conservative’s refugee 
reform package, which came into force in 2012. As Hilary Evans Cameron 
argues, the Conservatives strategically employed such rhetoric to make 
more salient the “mistake” of granting refugee protection to those who do 
not need it and reducing the salience of failing to protect those who do.30
Evans Cameron quotes former Conservative Immigration Minister Jason 
Kenney as saying that “when Canadians don’t think the government can 
control its own borders, public support for generous levels of immigration 
drops signi? cantly.”31 In this way, they prepared the way for their reforms. 
Hélène Mayrand’s contribution notes that between 2012 and 2015, the 
government put aside $15 million to pursue applications to bring successful 
25. IRPA, s 55(3.1). This provision requires the detention of “designated foreign nationals” sixteen 
years or older, subject to review after 14 days and then every six months (IRPA, s 57.1(1) and (2)). This 
differs from the general detention regime, under which initial detention is discretionary and reviews 
take place within 48 hours, 7 days, and subsequently every 30 days (IRPA, ss 55(1)-(3) and s 57). The 
designated foreign national regime came into force under PCISA, supra note 10, on 15 December 2012.
26. IRPA, s 110(2) denies the right of appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to certain categories 
of refugee protection claims and of certain types of decisions. These provisions also came into force 
under PCISA, which amended the earlier BRRA, supra note 10; the BRRA had contained provisions 
to implement the new RAD with no restrictions on appeal rights (for discussion, see Grant & Rehaag, 
supra note 10). The Conservative government also further restricted access to appeals of non-refugee 
deportation cases: see the Faster Removals of Foreign Criminals Act, SC 2013, c 16, s 24 [FRFCA], 
amending IRPA, 64(3). 
27. IRPA, ss 87.4 and 87.5. These provisions cancelled pending applications under the Federal Skilled 
Worker, the Federal Investor, and the Federal Entrepreneur classes. Challenges to both provisions, on 
several grounds, failed: Austria v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 191; Jia v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 146.
28. Carver, supra note 4 at 209.
29. Catherine Dauvergne, The New Politics of Immigration and the End of Settler Societies (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) at 2, 4, 143 and 202.
30 Hilary Evans Cameron, “The Battle for the Wrong Mistake: Risk Salience in Canadian Refugee 
Status Decision-Making” (2019) 49:1 Dal LJ 1.
31. Evans Cameron, ibid at 7, citing Jason Kenney, “Speaking notes for the Honourable Jason Ken-
ney, PC, MP Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism at an event at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Western Ontario” (London, Ontario, 11 Feb 2011), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/
department/media/speeches/2011/2011-02-11.asp> [https://perma.cc/L6LC-2PW9].
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refugees’ protection to an end, resulting in the loss of status in 224 cases.32
Chiarelli’s “fundamental principle” seems to abet such strategies. Yet, 
on the other hand, in stating that principle, Justice Sopinka in Chiarelli 
added the unexplained word “unquali? ed”: “non-citizens do not have an 
unquali? ed right to enter or remain in the country.” (Emphasis added.) 
The implicit suggestion is that non-citizens might have a quali? ed right to 
enter or remain.33 Later Justice Sopinka suggests, albeit in the course of 
rejecting Mr. Chiarelli’s constitutional argument, that the Charter would 
only permit “legitimate, non-arbitrary” grounds of deportation.34 These 
aspects of Chiarelli, it seems to us, contain the germ of a different face that 
immigration law might turn toward an unstable immigration politics, one 
that might allow us to make sense of the idea of having a quali? ed right to 
enter or remain. This different face would be one grounded in the search for 
principled interpretations of the law that take the interests of non-citizens 
into account to some extent alongside those of citizens. If no such principled 
alternative exists, Justice Sopinka’s references to non-arbitrariness and 
legitimacy would be empty gestures. 
It is, in fact, surprising that much of the case law that has emerged 
since the beginning of the Harper-led Conservative government can be 
interpreted as developing this germ of principle; as a search for ways to limit 
the illegitimacy and arbitrariness of immigration law. Indeed, it might be 
said that almost all Supreme Court decisions related to immigration (with 
one exception, Khosa,35 to which we return below)—and more than a few 
lower court decisions as well36—since the start of the Conservative’s time 
in power have sought to soften the sharp edges of immigration politics as 
expressed in legislation with a principled consideration of the interests of 
32. Mayrand, supra note 17 at 3-4.
33. In French, the passage is translated as: « Or, le principe le plus fondamental du droit de l’immi-
gration veut que les non-citoyens n’aient pas un droit absolu d’entrer au pays ou d’y demeurer. » 
34. Chiarelli, supra note 23 at para 27. 
35. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 [Khosa]. 
36. See, e.g., Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651 (strik-
ing down limits on access to health care for certain protection claimants); YZ v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892 (striking down limits on the right to appeal to the Refugee 
Appeal Division for claimants from countries designated as safe) [YZ]; Fehrer v Canada (Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 FC 335 (striking down three-year bar, after unsuccessful refugee 
protection claims, on making claim for a “pre-removal risk assessment” for claimants from countries 
designated as safe) [Fehrer].
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non-citizens.37 We will not belabour the point by discussing each case. Nor 
do we want to paint too rosy a picture. Still, it is worth examining the ways 
in which the Court seems to be striving, in these cases, to meet the interests 
of non-citizens halfway.
Take an under-discussed example, Agraira v Canada (Minister of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness).38 Mr. Agraira was a Libyan 
national who, having been found inadmissible for membership in a terrorist 
organization, sought a Ministerial exemption on the grounds that his 
presence in Canada would not be “detrimental to the national interest.”39
The Minister at the time (again, Mr. Toews) rejected the application against 
the advice of his own department. He wrote a brief, bullet-point decision 
that focused exclusively on the terrorist nature of the group to which Mr. 
Agraira had belonged, while failing to remark upon other factors in the 
? le—such as the presence of two children in Canada and an established 
transport business—or to note that the evidence of the group’s terrorism was 
limited. The Federal Court found the decision unreasonable on this basis. 
The Federal Court of Appeal reversed, ? nding that the “national interest” 
was limited to the protection of public and national security.40
The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision. 
However, in doing so, it attributed to the Minister an interpretation of the 
term “national interest” that went beyond security concerns, to include 
such things as Charter values, the degree to which applicants have become 
established in Canada, and the degree to which they have adopted democratic 
values, among other considerations.41 That is, the Court ? rst de? ned the 
“national interest” broadly and in a way that would favour future non-
citizen applicants. It then found the Minister had in fact applied that broad 
meaning of the term, leading to the rejection of Mr. Agraira’s judicial 
review application. In one sense, this decision represents a case of abject 
deference to the executive on a security-related immigration matter: the 
court seemed to stretch to the limit the permission it had granted itself to 
“consider the reasons that could be offered for the decision when conducting 
37. These are: Charkaoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Solicitor General), 
2007 SCC 9; Charkaoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38; Canada 
(Attorney General) v Mavi, 2011 SCC 30; R. v Pham, 2013 SCC 15; Ezokola v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40; Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Pre-
paredness), 2013 SCC 36 [Agraira]; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37; 
Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 [Febles]; B010 v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 [B010]; R v Appulonappa 2015 SCC 59; Kanthasamy v Canada (Citi-
zenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61; Tran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 
2017 SCC 50; R v Wong, 2018 SCC 25. For a contrary view of the Supreme Court’s record with respect 
to non-citizens, speci? cally with respect to the application of the Charter, see Catherine Dauvergne, 
“How the Charter has Failed Non-Citizens: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada 
Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill LJ 663.
38. Agraira, supra note 37.
39. IRPA, s 34(2) (repealed). 
40. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Agraira, 2011 FCA 103, rev’g Ramadan 
Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FC 1302.
41. Agraira, supra note 37, at para 65.
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a reasonableness review”42 in order to credit the Minister with a broad 
consideration of factors that simply do not seem to feature in his thinking. 
Yet the Court also interpreted the ministerial exemption power in a way that 
would have encouraged more principled decisions on future applications. 
On the broader issue of statutory interpretation, the Minister lost. We 
believe similar analyses can be made of many of the cases decided in the 
Harper-and-after era. The Supreme Court and some lower court decisions 
often seem to want to restrain arbitrariness by appealing to deeper public 
law values that can be found in doctrines of statutory interpretation, Charter 
principles, or international law obligations. 
However, while we think that the Court has demonstrated a tendency to 
try to place immigration law on a more principled foundation—to qualify 
the non-citizens’ absence of rights—, there are many reasons for avoiding 
complacency. In concluding this introduction, we will mention four. The 
? rst is that a determined government which sees judicial interventions as 
unwarranted limitations on sovereign power, and which is not concerned 
about being perceived to be making decisions focused solely on national 
self-interest, can usually ? nd legislative workarounds. Agraira, again, is a 
case in point. The Supreme Court released Agraira on 20 June 2013. On 
19 June 2013, a government amendment came into force stating that “the 
Minister may only take into account national security and public safety 
considerations.”43 So, a day prior to the Court’s decision, the government 
legislatively overruled it. The Harper-era government was adept at such 
moves or counter-moves, drawing up legislation in ways to deprive the courts 
of interpretive or other means of softening otherwise callous measures. In 
no area did the government empower itself and future governments more, 
perhaps, than with the dramatically expanded use of a sub-legislative device 
known as Ministerial Instructions, which do not require the parliamentary 
scrutiny normally applied to new legislation or regulations. Through the 
use of Ministerial Instructions, the government created a parallel regime of 
novel immigration categories, thoroughly revamped the temporary labour 
immigration regime, and completely overhauled of the federal skilled worker 
program through the Express Entry system. As Kaushal discusses in this 
issue, such instructions are nearly immune from judicial interference, since 
any unwanted judicial interpretation can be overturned Agraira-style, only 
with far greater ease.
A second reason not to be too impressed with the Court’s search for 
principle is that one kind of counter-move often made by the Harper-era 
Conservatives involved the shaping of discretionary powers in a way that 
resists judicial interference.  The IRPA is spangled with such powers. Some 
42. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 
at para 54. For discussion, see Sharryn Aiken et al, eds, Immigration & Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary, 2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 158-159.
43. IRPA, s 42.1(3). The amendments had consolidated the exemption powers formerly found in 
paragraphs 34(2), 35(2), and 37(2) of the IRPA. See FRFCA, s 18.
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are expressly legislated, such as the power to provide relief for “humanitarian 
and compassionate” reasons.44 Others have been developed through judicial 
or executive interpretation, such as the discretion of an immigration of? cer 
to defer the removal of a foreign national because of the risk they would 
face once home.45 The Conservative government steadily clawed back the 
availability of those discretionary powers that might favour non-citizens 
under the IRPA. For instance, it amended the IRPA to make humanitarian 
exemptions unavailable to persons inadmissible on security grounds and 
certain grounds of criminality.46 At the same time, it added or strengthened 
discretionary powers aimed at exclusion. For example, it added discretionary 
powers that would allow the government to take strict measures aimed at 
discouraging mass arrivals, in a manner that decidedly does not seek to 
take the interests of the affected non-citizens into account.47 It also added 
powers that allow for the designation of putatively safe countries on the 
basis of opaque mathematical formulae; nationals of such countries enjoyed 
less favourable procedures when making their refugee claims.48 Every 
discretionary power that was modi? ed or created by the Conservative 
government remains in place in the IRPA.
Third, as discussed by Amar Khoday and Gerald Heckman, the approach 
to the standard of review that grew out of the Supreme Court’s Dunsmuir 
decision in 200849 has largely insulated administrative decisions made 
under the IRPA from judicial review on a correctness basis. Of course, 
this is the result of developments in Canadian administrative law outside 
44. That is, the power to grant exemptions from the normal operation of the IRPA based on “humani-
tarian and compassionate considerations.” This power is in fact granted by several provisions: IRPA, 
ss 25(1), 25.1(1), 67(1)(c), 68(1), and 69(2). In the ? rst two cases the power is the Minister’s; in the 
last three, it is exercised by the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB).
45. The sub-Supreme federal courts have found this power in IRPA, s 48. See, e.g. Baron v Canada 
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2009 FCA 81.
46 IRPA, s 25(1) was amended to bar humanitarian and compassionate applications to persons inadmis-
sible on grounds of security, the violation of international rights, or organized criminality (respectively 
IRPA, ss 34, 35 and 37). Such persons also do not have a right to appeal removal orders to the IAD 
(IRPA, s 64), which otherwise has the power to grant humanitarian exemptions (see note 27, above).
47 IRPA, s 20.1 allows the Minister of Public Security to designate groups of foreign nationals as 
“irregular arrivals” if he or she is of the opinion that they cannot be examined in a timely manner or if 
he or she suspects that their arrival was “in relation” to an act of people smuggling. Members of such 
groups become “designated foreign nationals,” subject among other things to mandatory detention, if 
sixteen years of age or older, with less frequent detention reviews. See note 25, supra.
48 IRPA, s 109.1 allows for the designation of certain purportedly safer countries based on the rates 
of rejection, withdrawal or abandonment of claims from those countries. Nationals from so-called 
designated countries of origin were previously subject to a six-month bar on work permits, a bar on 
appeals at the Refugee Appeals Division, limited access to the Interim Federal Health Program and a 
36-month bar on the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment. The courts have struck down some parts of this 
regime as unconstitutional: see YZ and Fehrer, supra note 36. In May 2019, the government announced 
they were removing all countries from the list of designated countries, effectively ending the program 
(see Government of Canada, “Canada ends the Designated Country of Origin practice” (17 May 2019), 
online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2019/05/canada-ends-the-
designated-country-of-origin-practice.html>. Thus far, however, the empowering provisions remain in 
place.”
49. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9.
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the immigration domain. In the case of the IRPA, however, as Khoday and 
Heckman argue, this deferential approach can be worrying because so many 
immigration-related decisions involve human rights. This brings us back to 
Khosa,50 which involved an application for judicial review of a decision by 
the Immigration Appeal Division denying an Indian national a humanitarian 
exemption from deportation. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the 
application, but was reversed by the Supreme Court, which characterized 
the decision as one of “policy, not law”51 in a context in which the individual 
has “no right whatever” but rather “attempts to obtain a discretionary 
privilege.”52 The case cited in support of this last conclusion was Prata, upon 
which Justice Sopinka had relied for his fundamental principle in Chiarelli.53
Thus, the fundamental principle, allied with Dunsmuir-style deference, is 
used by the courts to justify a hands-off approach when examining how 
administrative decision-makers consider the interests of non-citizens.
Fourth, while the Court may have ruled in favour of non-citizens on many 
issues in recent years, it remains exceptionally hard, and in some respects 
has gotten harder, to bring Charter scrutiny to bear on decisions affecting 
non-citizens. In this volume, Donald Galloway argues that the Supreme 
Court’s equality rights jurisprudence in the context of immigration eschews 
its vaunted substantive approach because the Court is overly impressed with 
the fact that section 6 of the Charter grants the right to enter and remain in 
Canada only to citizens.54 That has led to an equality rights jurisprudence 
that “ensures that harsh and oppressive forms of treatment will likely 
be viewed as unique or isolated and directed towards discrete groups of 
non-citizens rather than as indicative of a more general and entrenched 
antagonism towards non-citizens as a whole.”55 Galloway criticizes the 
basic premise of this impoverished jurisprudence, namely that differential 
treatment between citizens and non-citizens is effectively treated as “immune 
from section 15 challenge.”56 Instead, he argues for an approach to equality 
rights in which laws affecting non-citizens as such are susceptible to Charter 
scrutiny on grounds coherent with the contextual approach that characterizes 
contemporary equality jurisprudence outside the immigration domain. 
A similar story might be told regarding the protections found in section 
7 of the Charter for the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person. 
Although the Singh decision is still generally cited for the proposition that 
section 7 applies in the context of refugee protection claim hearings before 
the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board, the reality is that this is no longer the case. In Febles and B010, 
50 Khosa, supra note 35.
51. Ibid at para 17.
52. Ibid at para 57. 
53. See note 23, above.
54. Galloway, supra note 3 at 15.
55. Ibid at 33.
56. Ibid at 6.
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the Supreme Court rejected the claim that section 7 applies before either 
the RPD or in decisions that would affect the eligibility to make refugee 
claims.57 As a result, section 7 protections now appear to be available only 
just prior to removal.58 The upshot of the Court’s jurisprudence on sections 
7 and 15 of the Charter in the immigration context is that a weakened form 
of constitutionalism makes it easier legislatively to shield assertions of 
power over the non-citizen. 
We have argued that keeping the politics of immigration in view provides 
essential context and perspective when scrutinizing immigration law’s role 
in mediating the state’s expression of power over non-citizens. Maintaining 
such perspective seems especially important in a volatile political landscape 
in which even the putatively open and welcoming Trudeau Liberals, in the 
run-up to the next federal election, have taken steps to limit the right to make 
refugee protection claims. Under a proposed amendment to the IRPA, persons 
who have made claims for protection in a country with which Canada has 
entered into an “information sharing” agreement will no longer be eligible 
to claim protection in Canada;59 it is unclear what an “information sharing” 
agreement might be, although a good bet might be one of the memoranda 
of understanding through which Canada shares information on immigration 
matters with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.60 If that is right, the amendment amply demonstrates the reasons for 
caution just listed: it is a pre-emptive legislative counter-move that may 
render meaningless current litigation challenging the continuing application 
of the Safe Third Country Agreement; its application depends on the exercise 
of the discretionary power to enter into “information sharing” agreements 
with other countries (without apparent limit on who those countries might 
be); and challenges in judicial review to such ineligibility decisions would 
be extraordinarily dif? cult to win because they would be evaluated by the 
courts on a deferential standard of review and largely immune to Charter 
scrutiny. It is yet another instance in which the study of immigration law 
cannot be divorced from the underlying politics.
57. See Febles supra note 37 at para 68 and B010 supra note 37 at para 75.
58. For discussion, see Idil Atak, Graham Hudson, and Delphine Nakache, “The Securitisation of 
Canada’s Refugee System: Reviewing the Unintended Consequences of the 2012 Reform” (2018) 37:1 
Refugee Survey Q 1, at 14-17; Colin Grey, “Thinkable: The Charter and Refugee Law after Appulo-
nappa and B010” (2016) 76 SCLR (2d) 111; Gerald Heckman, “Revisiting the Application of Section 
7 of the Charter in Immigration and Refugee Protection” (2017) 68 UNBLJ 312.
59. Bill C-97, Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, cl 306.
60. For information, see Department of Homeland Security, Five-Country Joint Enrollment and 
Information-Sharing Project (FCC) (4 April 2019), online: <www.dhs.gov/publication/? ve-country-
joint-enrollment-and-information-sharing-project-fcc> [perma.cc/QN78-56NQ].
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